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Abstract
Although the integration of two-sided matching markets using stable mecha-
nisms generates expected gains from integration, I show that there are worst
case scenarios in which these are negative. The losses from integration can be
large enough that the average rank of an agent’s spouse decreases by 37.5%
of the length of their preference list in any stable matching mechanism.
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1. Introduction
The theory of two-sided matching has been helpful to analyze and improve
the allocation of goods without money, such as the assignment of students to
public schools or of kidneys available for transplantation to patients in need.
In particular, a recent branch of the literature has focused on understand-
ing why small matching markets struggle to integrate into large centralized
clearinghouses. For example, Ashlagi and Roth (2014) and Agarwal et al.
(2018) document that American hospitals refrain to disclose their available
kidneys for transplantation to centralized clearinghouses and even refrain
to join them at all (62% of kidney exchange transplants are within hospital
transplants that are not facilitated by a centralized clearinghouse). Similarly,
Ekmekci and Yenmez (2018) show that schools have incentives to conduct
their own independent admissions instead of joining a centralized admission
system.
In both cases, the failure of integration has important consequences: if all
hospitals were fully integrated into a centralized kidney exchange program,
they would be able to conduct more transplants and thus would save more
lives. Similarly, the integration of school admissions into a unified process
would reduce both the number of vacant seats in schools and the number
of unassigned students, while at the same time reducing the severe racial
segregation within school districts (Hafalir and Yenmez, 2017).
The aforementioned articles document several reasons of why matching
markets fail to integrate when doing so could generate welfare gains (and
estimations suggest that in some markets the gains from integration are sub-
stantial, as in the case of kidney exchange in US (Agarwal et al., 2018)). In
this paper, I show theoretically that, in worst-case scenarios, matching mar-
kets may fail to integrate because doing so would inevitable generate welfare
losses in a well-defined sense. This worst-case result is somewhat surprising
since the integration of two-sided matching markets never harms more people
than those it benefits ex-post and generates expected welfare gains for both
sides of the market (Ortega, 2018).
In my framework, there are κ disjoint Gale-Shapley matching problems,
each of size n. Agents are first assigned a spouse within their community so
that the matching in each market is stable. Then all communities integrate
as a society and a stable matching is realized again, now allowing agents to
marry any agent of opposite gender in the society. I measure the individual
gains from integration as the difference in the spouse ranking before and
after integration occurs. This is, if an agent obtains his 5th best partner
before integration and his 2nd best after integration, there is a difference in
ranking of +3 and this agent experiences gains from integration. The spouse
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ranking is a common welfare measure in matching markets (Wilson, 1972;
Pittel, 1989; Ashlagi et al., 2017).
Similarly, the total gains from integration of a society are the sum of the
gains from integration of each of its agents. The sum of spouse rankings
is a natural welfare measure previously studied by Knuth (1976, 1996) and
Knoblauch (2009) to analyze the properties of random markets. Thus, the
sum of individual gains from integration is an intuitive way to measure the
degree to which integration is perceived as favourable.
I show with an example that in specific matching markets the gains from
integration can be negative. By providing an algorithm on how to create
replicas of a matching problem, I show that the losses from integration can
be made large enough that on average the ranking of each agent’s spouse
decreases by 3
8
of the length of their preference list, equivalent to a welfare
reduction of 37.5%.
2. Model
A community C is a set of n men and n women. There are κ disjoint
communities. Given a set of communities, the society S is the set of all
communities. A population P ⊆ S is a set of communities in S. MP and W P
denote the sets of men and women in each community C ∈ P . Ci denotes
the i-th community and mij denotes the j-th man of community Ci. I use the
same notation for women wij and omit indexes whenever no confusion arises.
Each man m (resp. woman w) has strict preferences over the set of all
women in the society W S (resp. men MS). I assume for exposition that all
potential partners are desirable. I write w ≻m w
′ to denote that m prefers w
to w′. Given a population P , I call ≻P := (≻x)x∈(MP∪WP ) a preference profile
of the agents belonging to the communities in P . An extended matching
problem (EMP) is a triple (MS,W S;≻S).
Given a population P , a matching µ : (W P ∪MP ) 7→ (W P ∪MP ) is a
function of order two (µ2(x) = x) such that if µ(m) 6= m, then µ(m) ∈ W P ,
and if µ(w) 6= w, then w ∈MP . An agent is matched to himself if he remains
unmatched. A matching scheme σ : (MS ∪ W S) × 2S 7→ (MS ∪W S) is a
function that specifies a matching σ(·, P ) for every P ∈ 2S, i.e. σ(·, P ) :
(MP ∪ W P ) 7→ (MP ∪ W P ). Here we will only be interested in σ(·, C)
and σ(·, S) which denote the matching before and after integration occurs.
Matching schemes are analogous to the concept of assignment schemes in
cooperative game theory (Sprumont, 1990).
A matching µ : (W P ∪ MP ) 7→ (W P ∪ MP ) is stable if there is no
man m ∈ MP and no woman w ∈ W P that are not married to each other
(µ(m) 6= w) such that w ≻m µ(m) and m ≻w µ(w). Any such pair (m,w) is
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called a blocking pair. A matching scheme σ is stable if the matching σ(·, P )
is stable in every population P ⊆ S.
The raw rank of a woman w in the preference order of a manm over all po-
tential spouses in the society is defined by rkm(w) :=
∣∣{w′ ∈ W S : w′ <m w}∣∣.
Similarly, rkw(m) denotes the raw rank of m in the preference order of
w. Note that the length of each preference order is κn, i.e. each agent
ranks κn different potential partners. As it will be more convenient, we will
use the percentile ranking instead of the raw ranking, which is defined as
rˆkm(w) :=
rkm(w)
κn
. Thus, if rkm(w) = κn, then rˆkm(w) = 1, meaning that
the fraction of potential partners who are equally or more preferred than w
by m is 1, i.e. everybody.
The gains from integration for agent x under the matching scheme σ
are defined as γx(σ) := rˆkM(σ(x, C)) − rˆkM(σ(x, S)). The total gains from
integration are given by Γ(σ) :=
∑
x∈S γx. If these are negative, we speak
of the total losses from integration. The average gains from integration are
denoted by Γ(σ) = Γ(σ)
2κn
. Note that Γ(σ) ∈ (−1, 1).
3. Results
Unfortunately, integration produces total welfare losses in some EMPs if
the matching before and after integration occurs is stable.
Proposition 1. There exist EMPs such that Γ(σ) < 0 in any stable matching
scheme.
Proof. Let n = 2 and κ = 2. Consider the following preferences (pref-
erences that remain unspecified are irrelevant; the partner obtained before
integration appears in a circle, whereas the partner obtained after integration
appears in a square):
m11 : w
2
1 ≻ w
1
2 w
1
1 : m
2
1 ≻ m
1
2
m12 : w
1
1 ≻ w
2
1 ≻ w
1
2 w
1
2 : m
1
1 ≻ m
2
1 ≻ m
1
2
m21 : w
1
1 ≻ w
2
2 w
2
1 : m
1
1 ≻ m
2
2
m22 : w
2
1 ≻ w
1
1 ≻ w
1
2 ≻ w
2
2 w
2
2 : m
2
1 ≻ m
1
1 ≻ m
1
2 ≻ m
2
2
In any stable matching σ(mi1, Ci) = w
i
2 and σ(m
i
2, Ci) = w
i
1 for i ∈ {1, 2}
because all agents get their most preferred partner inside their own com-
munity and thus the matching σ(·, Ci) is stable. In any stable matching
σ(mi1, S) = w
j
1 for i ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j because m
i
1 and w
j
1 are the best possi-
ble spouses for each other, and thus none of these agents could be in any
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blocking pair. Then σ(m12, S) = w
1
2 because both get their best achievable
partner among those remaining. Finally, σ(m22, S) = w
2
2 so that both agents
obtain their worst partner in S, yet no other partner prefers them over their
current partner, and thus the matching σ(·, S) is stable. We conclude that
the matching scheme σ is stable.
The gains from integration (in raw ranking terms) for men in this unique
stable matching scheme are −3 rank positions, and by symmetry of the prob-
lem the gains from integration (in raw ranking terms) for women are −3 as
well. Normalizing them in percentile terms, we have that ΓS(σ) = −
6
4
and
ΓS(σ) = −
3
16
.
What drives the existence of welfare losses from integration in the pre-
vious example is that agents’ preferences are constructed so that those who
benefit from integration (exactly half of the society) experience very small
welfare gains (+1 in a raw rank measure). In contrast, those harmed by
integration (the other half of the society) find themselves married to much
less preferred partners. Neither the fact that exactly half of the society ex-
periences losses from integration nor the particular way in which preferences
were constructed are a coincidence, and we will return to this example in
Proposition 3.
A natural follow-up question is how big can total losses from integration
be. A trivial upper bound is easy to compute.
Proposition 2. Γ(σ) ≥ −1
2
+ 1
κn
in any EMP and any stable matching
scheme.
Proof. From Proposition 2 in Ortega (2018), we know that the number of
agents who get hurt by integration is weakly lower than the number of agents
who benefit from integration. The smallest gain from integration is (+1) in
raw ranking terms. The largest loss from integration is (κn − 1) in raw
ranking terms. Thus
Γ(σ) ≥ κn(
−κn + 1
κn
) + κn(
1
κn
) = −κn + 2 (1)
and Γ(σ) ≥ −1
2
+ 1
κn
. The term 1
κn
becomes negligible in large markets
and thus the inequality asymptotically becomes Γ(σ) ≥ −1
2
.
Expression 1 establishes that the total losses from integration could be
such that the ranking of agents’ spouses goes down by almost 50% of the
length of their preference order, a very big loss which becomes even larger
as the size of the market grows. However, the above upper bound is not
achievable, because in the case of n = 2 and κ = 2 the greatest lower bound
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for Γ(σ) is − 3
16
instead of −1
4
. In the following Proposition, I provide an
attainable bound on the losses from integration, which shows that the losses
of integration can be substantial and do not vanish in large matching markets.
Proposition 3. For any n and k even, there exists an EMP where Γ(σ) ≤
−3
8
+ 3
4κn
in any stable matching scheme.
Proof. I show that one can generate such an EMP by cloning the society in
the proof of Proposition 1. Cloning a matching problem was first done by
Irving and Leather (1986) to establish an upper bound on the number of
stable marriages. The approach of creating clones or replicas of an economy
has been used to establish other properties of matchings in large markets
(Wooders, 1998; Kojima and Manea, 2010; Azevedo and Hatfield, 2015; Liu
and Pycia, 2016; He et al., 2018) and has a long tradition in economics since
its use by Debreu and Scarf (1963) to prove the equivalence of the core and
the competitive equilibrium in large markets. Clones are denoted by a prime
symbol (i.e. the clone of agent mji is denoted by m
j
i′) and the set of clone
men and women are denoted by M ′ and W ′, respectively.
I use the notationM+ andW+ to denote the men and women who benefit
from integration. Similarly, the notation M− and W− denotes the men and
women harmed by integration. The replication of the EMP will be such that
the clone of each agent in M+∪W+ will also be in M ′+∪W ′+, and the clone
of every agent in M− ∪W− will be in M ′− ∪W ′−.
The preferences of the clones in M ′+ ∪W ′+ will be isomorphic to those
of the original agents in M+ ∪W+, meaning that if an agent mji prefers w
h
l
over wpf , then agent m
j
i′ prefers w
h
l′ over w
p
f ′. The preferences of the clones in
M ′+ ∪W ′+ will be such that
1. Their most preferred partner will be isomorphic to the one of the orig-
inal agent.
2. Women will prefer any agents inM+∪M ′+ over any agent inM−∪M ′−
(the same is true for men).
3. The preferences of women (resp. men) overM−∪M ′− (resp. W−∪W ′−)
are lexicographic according to the following criteria:
(a) Agent xij is preferred to agent x
h
p if i < j (agents from communities
with smaller indexes are preferred),
(b) If both agents belong to the same community, agent xhi is preferred
to agent xhj if i < j,
(c) If both agents have the same sub- and superindices, then the orig-
inal is preferred to the clone.
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The EMP below shows the corresponding replica of the EMP in the proof
of Proposition 1.
m11 : w
2
1 ≻ w
1
2 w
1
1 : m
2
1 ≻ m
1
2
m11′ : w
2
1′ ≻ w
1
2′ w
1
1′ : m
2
1′ ≻ m
1
2′
m12 : w
1
1 ≻W
+ ≻ w12 w
1
2 : m
1
1 ≻M
+ ≻ m12
m12′ : w
1
1′ ≻W
+ ≻ w12 ≻ w
1
2′ w
1
2′ : m
1
1 ≻ M
+ ≻ m21 ≻ m
1
2′
m21 : w
1
1 ≻ w
2
2 w
2
1 : m
1
1 ≻ m
2
2
m21′ : w
1
1′ ≻ w
2
2′ w
2
1′ : m
1
2′ ≻ m
2
1′
m22 : w
2
1 ≻W
+ ≻ w12 ≻ w
1
2′ ≻ w
2
2 w
2
2 : m
2
1 ≻M
+ ≻ m21 ≻ m
1
2′ ≻ m
2
2
m22′ : w
2
1′ ≻W
+ ≻ w12 ≻ w
1
2′ ≻ w
2
2 ≻ w
2
2′ w
2
2′ : m
2
1′ ≻M
+ ≻ m21 ≻ m
1
2′ ≻ m
2
2 ≻ m
2
2′
An identical argument to the one we used in the proof of Proposition 1
shows that the EMP above has a unique stable matching scheme, presented
above using circles and squares. In such unique stable matching scheme, κn
agents gain (+1) from integration in raw ranking terms, and κn agents have
welfare losses ranging from κn/2 to κn− 1 also in raw ranking terms.
The total gains from integration are therefore given by
Γ(σ) = κn
(
1
κn
)
−
2
κn
[
κn
2
−1∑
i=0
κn
2
+ i]
= 1−
2
κn
[
(κn)2
4
+
κn
2
−1∑
i=1
i]
= 1− [
κn
2
+
κn
4
−
1
2
]
=
3
2
−
3
4
κn
And thus Γ(σ) = −3
8
+ 3
4κn
. The constant term 3
4κn
becomes negligible in
large markets and thus the total losses of integration can be made asymp-
totically equivalent to −3
8
, i.e. a 37.5% of the size of the agents’ preference
lists.
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4. Conclusion
We can construct matching problems such that the sum of the individual
gains from integration from all its agents is negative. We can make the
problem arbitrarily large to show that the welfare losses remain significant
even in large markets.
In this article I have assumed that all communities have the same num-
ber of men and women, an unrealistic assumption which I have introduced to
simplify the analysis. Allowing communities to have different gender compo-
sition would reduce the magnitude of welfare losses. To observe this, suppose
a male-dominated community merges with a female-dominated one. In both
communities some agents, who were unmatched before integration, are now
able to find a partner in a more gender-balanced society. Those agents would
experience welfare gains which are not covered in my analysis. I leave a more
comprehensive study of integration of unbalanced matching markets for fur-
ther research.
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